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INTRODUCTION

The Illinois courts and legislature addressed many important
topics concerning property issues during the Survey year. The Illinois Supreme Court expanded application of the implied warranty
of habitability, ' yet maintained the common law boundaries of the
doctrine of lessor immunity. 2 The court also addressed the common law doctrine of emblements,3 and the position of a trustee to a
land trust.4 The legislature again defeated the proposed Tenants
Bill of Rights.5 The City of Chicago, however, enacted a Residen* Associate, Coffield, Ungaretti, Harris & Slavin; B.A., 1979, University of Michigan; J.D., 1982, Northwestern University.
** B.A., 1985, Wayne State University; J.D. candidate 1988, Loyola University of
Chicago. The authors would like to acknowledge the consultation of Henry Rose of
Loyola's Community Law Center for his assistance in reporting the City of Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance,which he assisted in drafting.
1. See infra notes 7-34 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 120-49 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
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tial Landlord and Tenant Ordinance which offers significant protections for tenants.6
II.

LANDLORD-TENANT

A. Implied Warranty of Habitability
In Glasoe v. Trinkle,7 the Illinois Supreme Court expanded tenants' rights by extending application of the implied warranty of
habitability' to all residential leases. 9 In Glasoe, a landlord, Merwin Glasoe ("Glasoe"), brought suit against Jerry and Diane Trinkle (the "Trinkles"), his former tenants, to recover $960.00 in
rent. 10 The court allowed the Trinkles to assert the defense of
breach of the implied warranty of habitability even though the municipality in which the house was located did not have an applicable building or housing code." In previous decisions involving
leases of residential real estate, Illinois courts relied on a building
code to determine whether the warranty had been breached. 2
The Trinkles entered into an oral agreement with Glasoe to rent
an apartment in the town of St. Joseph.1 3 The Trinkles vacated the
premises on October 17, 1981, and relocated to a nearby community. 14 They alleged their move was necessary because of numerous defects and substandard conditions on the premises,'5 the most
6. See infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
7. 107 Ill. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985).
8. See generally Dutenhaver, Non-Waiver of the Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin
Residential Leases, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41 (1978). Under common law principles, a
landlord had no duty to place or maintain rental premises in a habitable condition. Instead, a tenant had to rely on his own inspection and judgment. Id. Illinois is among the
many states which have departed from this doctrine and now imply a warranty of habitability in various real estate transactions. Id. See also R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 6.38 (1984) (implied warranty of habitability is a doctrine which imposes a
duty on landlords to maintain premises leased for residential use in a habitable
condition).
9. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
10. Id. at 5, 479 N.E.2d at 916.
11. Id. at 12, 479 N.E.2d at 919.
12. See Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrels, 84 Ill. 2d 178, 417 N.E.2d 1297 (1982); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 346, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
13. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 6, 479 N.E.2d at 916.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7, 479 N.E.2d at 917. The Trinkles presented testimony regarding the following defects: the only source of heat for the living room was a space heater that malfunctioned during the winter of 1978; the blower in the main furnace did not operate for
two weeks in the winter of 1980; Glasoe installed an incorrect replacement motor for the
blower which caused the blower to run continuously; sewage leaked through the ceiling
into their bedroom and their children's bedroom on two occasions; problems with the
plumbing caused the toilet to overflow at various times; the bathroom ceiling collapsed in
1979 and was not replaced; water leaked through the ceiling into the kitchen; sewage
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substantial of which was a faulty furnace. 1 6 Subsequent to the
Trinkles' relocation, Glasoe filed suit against the Trinkles to collect
four months accrued rent. '" The Trinkles denied that any rent was
due and raised several affirmative defenses, including breach of the
implied warranty of habitability. 1
The appellate court held that the implied warranty of habitability did not apply because St. Joseph did not have a building code
for rental housing.' 9 The court reasoned that the previous decisions involving the implied warranty of habitability2" did not require expansion of the doctrine to include residential real estate in
locales lacking a building code.2 '
In overturning the appellate court's ruling, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that a rule requiring the application of housing or
building code standards in cases involving leases of residential
collected in an open ditch that had been dug by Glasoe; sewage leaked from sewer lines in
the basement into a sump pump and was then pumped into the yard; the unit was infested with cockroaches and rodents; the front door was difficult to open and close because it was swollen from the weather; there was a large hole in the decaying floor of the
back porch; and, the windows and doors were not properly sealed. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6, 479 N.E.2d at 916.
18. Id. The other affirmative defenses and counterclaims that the Trinkles asserted
were decided prior to the appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. In response to a claim
that Glasoe constructively evicted the Trinkles, the trial court held that the unavailability
of the furnace was a sufficient ground for application of that doctrine and awarded damages in an amount representing the difference between the rent the Trinkles paid Glasoe
for the old premises and the rent they paid at their new premises for the period of October 17, 1981 to November 31, 1981. The claim that Glasoe breached an agreement to
lower the living room ceiling and to replace the front door was withdrawn during trial.
Lastly, at trial, Glasoe stipulated that he had failed to return the Trinkles' security deposit and that he had charged various calls to the Trinkles' telephone. Id. at 7-9, 479
N.E.2d at 917-18.
For a definition of the constructive eviction doctrine which the Trinkles asserted
against Glasoe, see Freedman, Waldron, Fusco, Joslin, Schwemm, and Sing, Eviction and
Rent Claim Defenses and Counterclaims,in TENANT'S RIGHTS § 1.60 (Ill. Inst. for CLE

1978). The constructive eviction doctrine provides qualifying tenants with a defense to
actions for past due rent in those situations in which the landlord violates an express
covenant or an oral agreement to provide essential services or to maintain the premises
and this violation renders the premises useless for the purpose for which they were leased.
In order to qualify to use this defense, the tenant must vacate the premises within a
reasonable time after the landlord has had an opportunity to remedy the breach. Id.
19. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
20. Pole Realty Co., 84 111. 2d 178, 417 N.E.2d 1297; Jack Spring, Inc., 50 Ill. 2d 346,
280 N.E.2d 208.
21. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918. The court in Jack Spring, 50 Ill. 2d
346, 280 N.E.2d 208, was able to refer to a building code because the property was located in an area having an applicable building code. The Jack Spring court did not,
however, state that the presence of the building code was a requirement for application of
the doctrine, but instead, that substantial compliance with the pertinent building code
fulfilled the warranty. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10-11, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
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property but not in cases involving sales of new homes by buildervendors was inconsistent and illogical.22 The court noted that both
renters and purchasers of new homes legitimately expect that their
respective dwellings will be habitable, 2a and that this expectation
exists independent of a building code. 24 Therefore, the Glasoe
court held that a breach of the implied warranty of habitability was
not dependent upon the proof of a violation of a housing code. 5
Rather, the court stated that the existence of housing code viola26
tions should be only one of several factors which are considered.
The court declined to establish a standard for determining habitability, but set forth guidelines for such a determination. 27 The factors to be considered include the nature of the deficiency, the
length of time for which it persisted, the age of the structure, the
amount of the rent, the area in which the premises are located,
whether the tenant waived the defects and whether the defects resulted from abnormal or unusual use by the tenant. 2s The court
stressed that this list was not comprehensive, and further, that no
one factor should be dispositive of whether the implied warranty of
habitability had been breached.29
The Glasoe court further noted that a tenant who wishes to assert a claim of breach of the implied warranty of habitability must
give notice to the landlord of the alleged defect and must allow a
reasonable time for the landlord to correct the problem.3 0 Additionally, the alleged defect must render the premises unsafe or unsanitary, and thus unfit for occupancy. 31 The court concluded that
22. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
23. Id.
24. Id. See also Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (5th Dist.
1976). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Moran articulated a contention similar to that
set forth Glasoe. Justice Moran observed that allowing the nonexistence of a building
code to preclude application of the implied warranty of habitability effectively punished
inhabitants of the communities lacking such codes. Id. at 655, 356 N.E.2d at 583 (Moran, J., dissenting).
25. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918 (citing Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272,
290-91, 405 A.2d 897, 906 (1970)).
26. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
27. Id. at 14, 479 N.E.2d at 920.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 13, 479 N.E.2d at 920. For a discussion of the test used to define which
defects are of such a material nature to render the premises unsafe or unsanitary, see D.
HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW 122 (2d ed. 1986). An example of a material
defect is the deprivation of any of the essential "goods and services" which make up the
modem leasehold. A residential tenant expects to be able to eat, sleep, and have use of
sanitary facilities in the leasehold. Id. Further, the tenant expects to have safe and reasonable ingress and egress to and from the premises. Id.
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an objective standard should be applied in examining the question
of habitability. Accordingly, a tenant may defend an action for
rent initiated by his landlord and counterclaim3 2using the doctrine
of the implied warranty of habitability if the tenant can prove that
the premises are not habitable in the eyes of a reasonable person.33
With its decision in Glasoe, the Illinois Supreme Court continued the trend of extending application of the implied warranty of
habitability to various real estate transactions. 34 The Glasoe court
refused to restrict application of the doctrine based on the absence
of a building code, and instead, applied the doctrine to promote the
maintenance of residential premises in a habitable condition.
32. Glasoe, 107 Ill. 2d at 14, 479 N.E.2d at 920. The Trinkles counterclaimed for
damages sustained by them as a result of Glasoe's alleged breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. The breach of the implied warranty of habitability is treated traditionally
as sounding in contract, with basic contract remedies of damages, rescission, and reformation. If the damage remedy is chosen, several methods of measurement have been
used, including the "difference in value" and "percentage reduction in use" methods.
Additionally, a "repair and deduct" damage remedy has been recognized in certain situations. Id. at 15, 479 N.E.2d at 920-21.
Two different means may be utilized under the "difference in value" method. With the
first, the tenant's damages are measured by the difference between the fair rental value of
the premises in their warranted condition and their fair value during the occupancy by
the tenant in the unsafe, unsanitary, or unfit condition. Under the second, the tenant's
damages are measured by the difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value
of the premises during the occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe, unsanitary, or unfit
condition. Id. at 16, 479 N.E.2d at 921. The "percentage reduction in use" method
reduces the tenant's rent by a percentage reflecting the decrease in value and enjoyment
of the premises caused by defects that give rise to the breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. Id.
33. Id. at 14, 479 N.E.2d at 920.
34. Prior to Glasoe, the Illinois Supreme Court had addressed the implied warranty
of habitability in various settings. In Jack Spring, 50 Ill. 2d 346, 280 N.E.2d 208, the
Illinois Supreme Court first ruled on the implied warranty of habitability. The court in
Jack Spring held that the implied warranty of habitability applied to leases, both oral and
written, of multiple unit dwellings. Id. at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217.
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the implied warranty of habitability
to a variety of situations. For example, the doctrine has been applied to leases of single
family dwellings. Pole Realty Co., 84 Ill. 2d at 182, 417 N.E.2d at 1300. Outside of the
lease setting, the doctrine has been relied upon in contracts for the sale of new homes by
builder-vendors. Peterson v. Hubschman Construction Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 39-40, 389
N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (1979). Further, it has been applied to the sale of a new home by a
builder-vendor even though the builder-vendor lived in the house for approximately two
years before the sale, and previously had built only one house. Park v. Sohn, 89 Ill. 2d
453, 463, 433 N.E.2d 651, 656 (1982). Finally, the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability has been used for subsequent purchases of homes when latent defects can be traced
to the original builder-vendor. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 185, 418 N.E.2d
324, 331 (1982).
In the latter three situations, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the implied warranty
of habitabilty without requiring the existence of housing or building codes. Glasoe, 107
Ill. 2d at 11, 479 N.E.2d at 918.
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Therefore, occupants of premises which are uninhabitable may rely
on the protection offered by the implied warranty of habitabilty
regardless of the absence of a building code in the particular
municipality.
B.

Liability of Landlord to Third Parties

In Wright v. Mr. Quick, Inc.,3 the Illinois Supreme Court reexamined the general rule that the party in control of leased property, ordinarily the lessee, is liable for personal injuries caused by a
defective condition on the property.3 6 The plaintiff in Wright, an
employee of the lessee, brought suit against the lessor for injuries
which she sustained as the result of a defect in the premises. 37 The
plaintiff attempted to impose liability upon the lessor based on an
established exception to the doctrine of lessor immunity. 38 The exception attaches liability to the lessor when that lessor agrees to
maintain the premises in good repair and then fails to do SOo 39 The
Wright court, however, ruled that the exception did not apply because the defendant made no such agreement in his capacity as
lessor. 4° In so ruling, the Wright court reaffirmed the parameters
of the doctrine of lessor immunity and its exceptions.4"
Lisa Wright ("Wright"), an employee of Great Eight, Inc.
("Great Eight"), was injured when she fell in the company parking
lot.42 Great Eight operated a fast food restaurant pursuant to a
franchise agreement with Mr. Quick, Inc. ("Mr. Quick") and had
possession of the real property pursuant to a sublease with Mr.
Quick.4 3 Wright brought suit against Mr. Quick claiming that its
failure to maintain the premises caused her injuries. 44
35. 109 Ill. 2d 236, 486 N.E.2d 908 (1985).
36. The rule that the party in control of leased premises is liable for personal injuries
has been articulated in several Illinois cases. See, e.g., Seago v. Roy, 97 Ill. App. 3d 6, 8,
424 N.E.2d 640, 641 (3rd Dist. 1981); Shehy v. Bober, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1066, 398
N.E.2d 80, 84 (1st Dist. 1979); Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 647, 356 N.E.2d
575, 577 (5th Dist. 1976); Thorson v. Aronson, 122 Ill. App. 2d 156, 160, 258 N.E.2d 33,
34 (2d Dist. 1970).
37. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 237, 486 N.E.2d at 908.
38. Id. at 239, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
39. The exception to the doctrine of lessor immunity was articulated in Logger v.
Reynolds, 25 I11.App. 3d 1042, 1043-44, 324 N.E.2d 238, 239-40 (3rd Dist. 1975).
40. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 239-40, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
41. Id. at 243, 486 N.E.2d at 911.
42. Id. at 237, 486 N.E.2d at 908.
43. Id. The Wright court noted at the outset of its analysis that the basic principles of
landlord and tenant law govern the relationship between a sublessor and a sublessee. Id.
at 238, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
44. Id. at 237, 486 N.E.2d at 908. The Wright court noted that Wright's exclusive
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In her suit, Wright contended that Mr. Quick was within one of
the exceptions to the general rule of lessor immunity.4 5 The exception provides that a lessor is liable to his lessee or third parties if
the lessor has agreed to keep the premises in good repair, fails to do
so, and that failure causes physical harm to the lessee or a third
party. 46 The prime lease between Mr. Quick and the owners contained a covenant which provided that Mr. Quick would maintain
the premises in good condition.47 Wright claimed that this covenant was incorporated into the sublease with Great Eight. 48 Accordingly, Wright alleged that Mr. Quick, as lessor, and not Great
Eight, as lessee, was liable in tort to third parties injured on the
premises.49
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Wright's argument, and
concluded that the general rule of lessor immunity applied.i 0 The
remedy against her employer was provided under the Worker's Compensation Act. Id. at
237-38, 486 N.E.2d at 908 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-38.28 (1985)).
45. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 239, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
46. Id. at 238-39, 486 N.E.2d at 909. For a general explanation of the doctrine of
lessor immunity, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 355-62 (1970). The Restatement provides that a lessor of land is not subject to liability to his lessee or others
upon the land with the consent of the lessee or sublessee for physical harm caused by any
dangerous condition which comes into existence after the lessee has taken possession.
Further, the lessor is not liable to his lessee or to others on the land for physical harm
caused by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed when the
lessee took possession. Id. at §§ 355-56.
Exceptions to this general rule of lessor immunity are as follows: when the lessor contracts to repair, fails to exercise reasonable care to perform the contract, and thus creates
an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land; when the land contains an undisclosed
dangerous condition the presence of which is known or should be known to the lessor and
which is not known to the lessee; when the land is leased for a purpose that involves the
admission of the public and physical harm is caused to a member of that public by a
condition of the land existing when the lessee takes possession; when the lessor retains
control of some part of the land and physical harm is caused by a dangerous condition
upon that part of the land; when the lessor retains control of the part of the land which is
necessary to the safe use of the leased part and physical harm is caused by a dangerous
condition upon that part of the land; and, when a lessor of land makes repairs in a negligent manner and the condition resulting from this negligent repair causes physical harm.
Id. at §§ 357-62.
47. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 239, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
48. Id.
49. Id. The appellate court upheld Wright's interpretation of liability. In his dissent,
Justice Stouder observed the inherent weaknesses in the appellate court holding:
[T]he fallacy with this holding is that at the time of the execution of the original
lease, Mr. Quick, Inc., was contracting as lessee, not as lessor. In order for Mr.
Quick, Inc. to owe a duty to the plaintiff within this exception, the contract
would have had to have been executed with the sublessee, Great Eight, Inc.
Since it was not, the exception was inapplicable.
Wright v. Mr. Quick, Inc., 129 I11. App. 3d 226, 230, 472 N.E.2d 478, 480 (3rd Dist.
1984) (Stouder, J., dissenting).
50. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 243, 486 N.E.2d at 911.
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court further stated that Mr. Quick's covenant to repair in the
prime lease merely provided the owner of the premises with a contract remedy if Mr. Quick allowed the premises to fall into disrepair.5" The court reasoned that, because Mr. Quick wholly
demised the property to Great Eight, the tort liability shifted to
Great Eight as the tenant in possession. 2 Additionally, the court
stated that there was no agreement that Mr. Quick would indemnify or protect Great Eight.53 The court emphasized that the
franchise agreement between Mr. Quick and Great Eight, which
had been made a part of the sublease, expressly stipulated that
Great Eight was responsible for maintenance and repair. 4 The
court also emphasized that the overall language of the documents
indicated the parties' intent that the sublessee, Great Eight, be responsible for repair and maintenance.55 The court determined that
the parties understood the sublease to require Great Eight to fulfill
the duties which Mr. Quick agreed to undertake in the prime
lease. 6 The court in Wright determined that there was no conflict
between this allocation of the responsibility to repair and the failure of the prime lease to address the division of the duty of repair
between Mr. Quick and any sublessee. 7
The Wright court affirmed the principle that the parties to leasing arrangements, as well as subleasing arrangements, may rely
51. Id. at 239, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
52. Id. at 239-40, 486 N.E.2d at 909. The Illinois courts generally hold that a tenant
or occupant of leased premises, and not the owner, is responsible for injuries from a
defective condition of the demised premises. See, e.g., Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d
644, 647, 356 N.E.2d 575, 577 (5th Dist. 1976); Hardy v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 131
Ill. App. 2d 1038, 1041, 267 N.E.2d 748, 750 (5th Dist. 1971).
53. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 239-40, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
54. Id. at 240, 486 N.E.2d at 910.
55. Id. at 24042, 486 N.E.2d at 910-11. The franchise agreement provided as follows: "It is understood between the parties that the sublessee is to use the premises
herein demised for the operation of a 'Mr. Quick' store, and that in the operation of the
premises, the sublessee will comply with all of the terms and conditions and provisions of
the store franchise agreement which exists between the parties." Id. at 240, 486 N.E.2d
at 910. The sublease provided that the "[s]ublessee agrees to abide by and be bound by
the terms and conditions of the lease above referred to, except insofar as its terms are
changed and modified by this agreement," and that the sublease was "subject to" the
lease between the lessee and owner of the premises. Id. at 241, 486 N.E.2d at 910. The
Wright court stated that the choice of the terms "be bound by," "abide by," and "subject
to" indicated that the parties intended to place responsibilities on the sublessee, rather
than to create a right in the sublessee's favor. Id. at 241-42, 486 N.E.2d at 910-11.
56. Id. at 242, 486 N.E.2d at 910.
57. Id. at 242, 486 N.E.2d at 911. The sublease in Wright stated that it was "subject
to" the terms and conditions of the prime lease. As nothing in the prime lease referred to
the allocation of the duty to repair to a sublessee, however, there was nothing to which
the sublease could be subject. Id.
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upon the doctrine of lessor immunity. 58 The lessor, or lessee/sublessor, is immune from tort liability unless he fits into one of the
well delineated exceptions to the doctrine of lessor immunity.
Therefore, unless expressly provided to the contrary in the leasing
or subleasing agreement, a lessee or sublessee, as tenant in possession, will be held liable in tort to third parties as a result of a dangerous condition on the premises. The Wright case held that this
liability assignment will apply to the sublease situation, regardless
of any prior arrangements
between the original lessor and the
59
lessee/sublessor.
C.

The Doctrine of Emblements

In Leigh v. Lynch," the Illinois Supreme Court examined the
application of the common law doctrine of emblements to annual
or perennial crops. The doctrine of emblements permits a tenant
to cultivate and to remove certain crops from the land after termination of the tenancy. 6 Leigh involved a tenant farmer's attempt
to recover damages for crops destroyed after the termination of his
tenancy.62 The court rejected the tenant farmer's contention and
held that only those perennial crops which are the result of care
and attention during the year in which they are harvested are protected by the doctrine of emblements.63
Leigh, a farmer, rented land by oral agreement with the owners,
Ralph and Betty Troup, on a year-to-year basis.' On September 1,
1982, Leigh received written notice 65 that the Troups were selling
58. Several recent cases have restated the general principle of common law landlord
immunity in absence of facts sufficient to place the situation within the parameters of an
exception to that rule. See, e.g., Kostecki v. Pavlis, 140 Ill. App. 3d 176, 488 N.E.2d 644
(1st Dist. 1986); Hubbard v. Chicago Housing Authority, 138 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 486
N.E.2d 1297 (1st Dist. 1985). But see Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497
N.E.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1986), which expands by its facts the dimensions of the exception to
landlord immunity for criminal acts of third parties on the leased premises, thus providing an inroad for future dissolution of landlord immunity.
59. Wright, 109 Ill. 2d at 239-40, 486 N.E.2d at 909.
60. 112 Ill. 2d 411, 493 N.E.2d 1040 (1986).
61. Id. at 415, 493 N.E.2d at 1042. The doctrine, or right, of emblements was developed to ensure that a remainderman or reversioner under a life tenancy would not become entitled to growing crops immediately upon the death of the life tenant. Instead,
the undertenant was permitted to harvest the crops. Roberts v. McAllister, 226 Ill. App.
356 (2d Dist. 1922). Leigh demonstrates the modem application of the doctrine to a
tenancy other than a life tenancy.
62. Leigh, 112 Ill. 2d at 413, 493 N.E.2d at 1041.
63. Id. at 420, 493 N.E.2d at 1044.
64. Id. at 413, 493 N.E.2d at 1041.
65. Id. at 414, 493 N.E.2d at 1041. Notice was given in accordance with statutory
requirements. The applicable Illinois statute provides that a year-to-year tenant is enti-
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the property to Lynch, the defendant, and that Leigh's tenancy
would terminate as of January 1, 1983.66 Leigh already had seeded
clover on the property in January 1982.67 A crop of stubble hay
was available for harvest prior to the date set for termination of the
lease. Leigh, however, chose not to harvest it. 68 In February of
1983, after Leigh's tenancy had terminated, Leigh notified the
Troups that he intended to harvest the clover crop. 69 Nevertheless,
in May or June of 1983, Lynch destroyed the crop. 70 Leigh filed
suit seeking damages for his loss of income, alleging that he was
entitled to re-enter the property and harvest the clover under the
doctrine of emblements. 7' The appellate court determined that the
doctrine of emblements could be applied to clover, a perennial
crop, and awarded Leigh $3,000.72
The Illinois Supreme Court held that, although perennial crops
could qualify as emblements, the production of a qualifying perennial crop must result from the tenant's attention and care to the
crop in the same agricultural year as the proposed harvest would
occur. 73 The court noted that the crop claimed by Leigh was not
produced as the result of care and attention during the agricultural
year in which he desired to harvest the crop; rather, the crop was
produced as the result of care and attention during the previous
year.74 Therefore, the doctrine of emblements did not apply.75
In Leigh, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth a modem definition of a qualifying crop under the common law doctrine of emblements. The Leigh court held that in order for a tenant to utilize
the right of ingress and egress to harvest crops after the termination of that tenant's lease, those crops, even if perennial, must qualify as emblements.76 The Leigh court then defined emblements as
crops that have resulted from the attention and care of the tenant
during the agricultural year in which the harvest would occur.77
tied to notice to quit at least four months prior to the end of the year of letting. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-206 (1985).
66. Leigh, 112 Ill. 2d at 414, 493 N.E.2d at 1041.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 420, 493 N.E.2d at 1044.
69. Id. at 414, 493 N.E.2d at 1041.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 415, 493 N.E.2d at 1042.
73. Id. at 420, 493 N.E.2d at 1044.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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III.

PROCEDURAL INTERPRETATION

A. Forcible Entry and Detainer
In Vogel v. Dawdy,7 s the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
notice and demand provisions of the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Statute 79 as applied to subsequent purchasers of land sold under a
land contract. 80 In Vogel, the vendors brought a forcible entry and
detainer action against the vendees and two subsequent purchasers,
seeking possession of a tract of land that the vendors had sold to
the vendees by land contract."1 The vendors did not give the subsequent purchasers written notice and demand for possession. 2 The
court held that a forcible entry and detainer action may be maintained against a subsequent purchaser of land even though that
subsequent purchaser was not given written notice and demand.83
The land contract between the vendors, the Vogels, and the
vendees, the Dawdys, contained a clause which provided that the
Dawdys could not convey the land without the written consent of
the Vogels.8 4 The Dawdys, in breach of the contract, conveyed the
land to subsequent purchasers without obtaining the written consent of the Vogels.8 5 The Vogels brought suit for breach of contract, alleging that the Dawdys' breaches constituted defaults
under the contract.8 6 The Vogels further alleged that any rights
which the subsequent purchasers might have were subordinate to
the Vogels' right to possession under the land contract. 87 The circuit court entered summary judgment against the Dawdys and one
of the subsequent purchasers.88 The circuit court then proceeded
78. 107 Ill. 2d 68, 481 N.E.2d 679 (1985).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-102 (1985).
80. Vogel, 107 Ill. 2d 68, 481 N.E.2d 679.
81. Id. at 70, 481 N.E.2d at 680.
82. Id. at 75, 481 N.E.2d at 683.
83. Id. at 76, 481 N.E.2d at 683.
84. Id. at 71, 481 N.E.2d at 681. The contract provided that the purchaser would not
"sell, assign, grant, set over or convey the premises... without the prior written consent
of the sellers .... " Id. Further, the purchasers were to obtain specified insurance coverage and were to pay all taxes on the properties. The contract also provided that a breach
of any provision of [the contract] would be considered a default of the contract and warrant forfeiture. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 72, 481 N.E.2d at 681. The breaches alleged were as follows: the Dawdys
assigned their interest in the contract to third parties without the consent of the Vogels;
the Dawdys failed to provide the insurance coverage the contract required; the Dawdys
failed to pay real estate taxes on the properties; and, the Dawdys removed timber from
the property without the Vogels' consent. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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to trial and awarded to the Vogels possession of the tract of land
purchased by the other subsequent purchasers, the Suttles. s9
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit
court.9 ° In reaching its decision, the Vogel court analyzed the parameters of the various subsections to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute.9 The Suttles alleged that the Vogels failed to give
them the statutory notice required under Illinois Code of Civil Procedure section 9-102(5),92 a provision of the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute.93 The court stated that the Suttles were correct
in their assertion that section 9-102(5) requires that an action for
possession be preceded by a written demand for possession. 94 The
court held, however, that the Vogels were not proceeding under
that section.9" Instead, the Vogel court held that section 9102(2),96 which does not require a prior written demand for possession, was applicable. 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the defense of lack of notice was inappropriate and affirmed the award of
the property to the Vogels. 9s
89. Id. at 74, 481 N.E.2d at 682.
90. Id. at 78, 481 N.E.2d at 684.
91. Id.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-102(5) (1985).
93. Vogel, 107 Ill. 2d at 74-75, 481 N.E.2d at 682. The Forcible Entry and Detainer
Statute provides in relevant part:
The person entitled to possession of lands or tenements may be restored thereto
in the manner hereafter provided:
(5) When a vendee having obtained possession under a written or verbal
agreement to purchase lands or tenements, and having failed to comply with the
agreement, withholds possession, after demand in writing by the person entitled
to possession.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para 9-102(5) (1985) (emphasis added).
94. Vogel, 107 Ill. 2d at 74-75, 481 N.E.2d at 682.
95. Id. at 75, 481 N.E.2d at 683.
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-102(2) (1985). This statute provides in pertinent
part: "[t]he person entitled to possession of lands or tenements may be restored thereto
in the manner hereafter provided: .... (2) When a peaceable entry is made and the
possession unlawfully withheld." Id.
97. Vogel, 107 IlI. 2d at 76, 481 N.E.2d at 683 (citing Lockelt v. Stoltz, 323 Ill. App.
164, 55 N.E.2d 286 (lst Dist. 1944)). The Lockelt court held that a demand in writing
was required only if the plaintiff brought the action for possession under a clause which
specifically required it. Lockelt, 323 Ill. App. at 166-67, 55 N.E.2d at 287.
98. Vogel, 107 Ill. 2d at 78-77, 481 N.E.2d at 683-84. The court noted that the Suttles' defense that the Vogels waived their rights of nonassignment because they accepted
payments under the contract after becoming aware of the claimed breach was also inappropriate. No contractual relationship existed between the Vogels and the Suttles, and
therefore, the Suttles were not the proper parties to assert waiver of the nonassignment
clause as a defense. Furthermore, even if the Suttles were the proper party to assert the
defense of waiver, the defense of waiver generally is applied to "late payment" cases.
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The Illinois Supreme Court in Vogel based its holding on the
lack of a contractual relationship between the vendor under a land
contract and the subsequent purchasers of that land. After Vogel,
it is clear that a proceeding under section 9-102(5) of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure, which sets out the statutory requirement
of a written demand, applies only when a contractual relationship
exists between the party in possession and the party seeking possession. To the contrary, no written demand is required when proceeding under section 9-102(2). Instead, a proceeding under
section 9-102(2) requires only that the party in possession came
upon the property peaceably and thereafter withheld possession.99
B. Homestead Exemption Statute
In Bank of Illmo v. Simmons, '° the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fifth District clarified the Homestead Exemption Statute,
which provides certain homeowners with a $7,500.00 exemption
upon foreclosure.' 0 ' The Bank of Illmo ("Bank") sought to avoid
the retroactive application of an amendment to the Statute. 102 The
amendment replaced the phrase "every householder having a family"' °3 with "every individual."'10 The court rejected the Bank's
argument and held that the amendment should be applied retroactively to the date of the execution of the instrument upon which
the party sought foreclosure. 05
In Bank of Illmo, the defendant borrowed funds from the Bank
and executed a deed of trust' 06 as security. 1 7 The deed of trust did
0 8
not contain a waiver or release of Simmons' homestead rights.'
Homestead rights entitle certain homeowners to an exemption
amount upon foreclosure.' 1° Subsequently, Simmons defaulted,
Finally, the court noted that the other breaches were sufficient to support a judgment of
default. Id.
99. Id at 76, 481 N.E.2d at 683 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-102(2)
(1985)).
100. 142 Ill. App. 3d 741, 492 N.E.2d 207 (5th Dist. 1984).
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-901 (1985).
102. Bank of llmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 743, 492 N.E.2d at 210.
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, para. 1 (1979).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-901 (1985).
105. Bank of Illmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 492 N.E.2d at 212.
106. A deed of trust is an instrument by which the legal title to real property is placed
in one or more trustees, to secure payment of money or performance of some condition.
Although a deed of trust differs in form from a mortgage, it is essentially a security.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 373 (5th ed. 1979).
107. Bank of Illmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 742, 492 N.E.2d at 209.
108. Id.
109. When a homestead right is awarded, the amount of that right affixes as a first
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the Bank commenced an action to foreclose, and a default judgment was entered against Simmons. 110 Simmons petitioned to have
the default judgment vacated and his homestead exemption
amount set aside."' Simmons claimed that he was entitled to a
$7,500 exemption provided1 2for under the amendment to the Homestead Exemption Statute.'
On appeal, the Bank asserted that Simmons was not entitled to
retroactive application of the amendment. The Bank contended
that Simmons was required to comply with the terms of the statute
in effect at the time of execution of the deed of trust. 1

3

The statute

provided a homestead exemption in the amount of $10,000 to every
householder having a family.' 4 Under this standard, the defendant would not qualify for an exemption." 5 The appellate court
rejected the Bank's contention that the applicable statute was the
statute in effect
at the time the parties entered into the trust
6
arrangement."

In determining whether the retroactive application of the
amendment to the Homestead Exemption Statute was appropriate,
the court applied a balancing of interests approach." 7 The court
determined that the impairment of the Bank's rights as a creditor
did not outweigh Simmons' rights as the holder of a homestead
exemption."I8 The court held that it would be unjust to refuse to
lien upon the premises except as to any mortgages in which the right of homestead was
waived. Dixon v. Moller, 42 Ill. App. 3d 688, 690, 356 N.E.2d 599, 602 (5th Dist. 1976).
110. Bank of Illmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 743, 492 N.E.2d at 209-10.
111. Id. at 743, 492 N.E.2d at 209.
112. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-901 (1985)). The amended Homestead Exemption Statute provides in relevant part: "[e]very individual is entitled to an
estate of homestead to the extent in value of $7,500... and such homestead, and all right
and title therein, is exempt from attachment, judgment, levy or judgment sale for the
payment of his ...debts .... ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-901 (1985).
113. Bank of llmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 743, 492 N.E.2d at 210.
114. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, para. 1 (1979)). The Homestead Exemption
Statute then in effect provided in relevant part: "[e]very householder having a family
shall be entitled to an estate of homestead of the extent in value of $10,000 ... and all
right and title therein, shall be exempt from attachment, judgment, levy or judgment sale
for the payment of his . . . debts ...." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, para. 1 (1979).
115. Bank of lllmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 743, 492 N.E.2d at 210.
116. Id. at 744-46, 492 N.E.2d at 211-12.
117. Id. at 745, 492 N.E.2d at 211 (citing Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 I11.
2d
1, 20, 483 N.E.2d 226, 234 (1985)).
118. Bank of Illmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 493 N.E.2d at 211-12. The purpose of a
homestead exemption statute is to provide the debtor with the necessary shelter or the
means to acquire shelter required for his welfare during difficult economic circumstances.
Id. at 745, 492 N.E.2d at 211 (citing State Bank of Antioch v. Nelson, 132 Ill. App. 3d
120, 477 N.E.2d 77 (2d Dist. 1985)). The court in Bank of Illmo held that this purpose
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apply the amended Act retroactively.I 9
The decision of the appellate court in Bank of Illmo confirms the
retroactive application of the 1984 amendment to the Homestead
Exemption Statute. The holding in Bank of Ilimo is consistent
with the purpose of the homestead exemption: to provide the
debtor with the necessary shelter or means to acquire shelter during difficult economic circumstances. Nevertheless, by utilizing a
balancing of interests approach, rather than establishing a rule of
retroactive application, the Bank of l/mo court left the door open
for a party to convince the court that the retroactive application of
the amendment to the Homestead Exemption Statute would result
in manifest injustice in a particular situation.
IV.

CONSITUTIONAL DECISIONS

A. Land Trustee as Creditor: Retroactive Provision
In Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank,120 the Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois Land Trust Act (the
"Act").' 2 ' The Act permits a trustee to serve as both trustee and
creditor of the same land trust.12 2 Additionally, the Act provides
outweighed the Bank's rights as a creditor. Bank of Ilimo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 492
N.E.2d at 210.
But see Capitol Bank & Trust of Chicago v. Fascetta, 771 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1986), in
which the court held unconstitutional the retroactive application of an amendment to the
Illinois Homestead Act. Id. at 1080. The amendment provided that the homestead exemption be applied to personal property, including the res of a land trust. Id. The court
in Capitol Bank specifically noted the priority of the Bank's interest as creditor. Id.
119. Bank of Illmo, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 745-46, 492 N.E.2d at 211-12.
120. 108 Ill. 2d 1, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985).
121.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, paras. 81-84 (1985).

122. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 7-9, 483 N.E.2d at 228-29. The Illinois Land Trust Act
provides in pertinent part:
The fact that a trustee of a land trust is or becomes a secured or unsecured
creditor of the land trust, the beneficiaries of the land trust, or a third party
whose debt to such creditor is guaranteed by a beneficiary of the land trust,
shall not be deemed evidence of a breach of any fiduciary duty owed by said
trustee to the beneficiaries.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, para. 83 (1985). This legislation was passed in response to the
Illinios Supreme Court holding in Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Zarkin, 89 Ill.
2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841 (1982). Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 7, 483 N.E.2d at 228.
For purposes of the Act, a land trust in Illinois is defined as follows:
"Land trust" means any express agreement or arrangement whereof a use, confidence or trust is declared of any land, or of any charge upon land, for the use
or benefit of any beneficiary, under which the title to real property, both legal
and equitable, is held by a trustee subject only to the execution of the trust,
which may be enforced by the beneficiaries who have the exclusive right to
manage and control the real estate, to have possession thereof, to receive the net
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for its retroactive application. 123 The Glenview State Bank
124
("Bank") brought an action to foreclose on Sanelli's property.
In his defense, Sanelli contended that the retroactive application
provision of the Act was unconstitutional. 2 5 The court rejected
this contention, and held that the retroactive provision of the Act
was constitutional. 126
Sanelli and his wife entered into a land trust agreement with the
Bank, naming the Bank as trustee. 27 Under the agreement, the
Bank held both legal and equitable title to the property in trust for
the benefit of the Sanellis.' 28 The Sanellis subsequently assigned
their beneficial interest in the land trust to the Bank as security for
a loan from the Bank. 129 The Bank, therefore, was both trustee for
the Sanellis and a secured creditor. 130 The Sanellis defaulted on
their loan, and their beneficial interest in the trust property was
sold to the Bank at a public
sale. '3' The Bank then evicted the
132
Sanellis from the property.
The Bank, serving as both trustee and creditor, acted pursuant
to authority granted by the Act.' 33 Serving in these dual capacities, however, was contrary to a 1982 Illinois Supreme Court
135
case. 1 34 In Home FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Zarkin,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that a land trustee owes a fiduciary
duty to the trust's beneficiaries and it is a breach of fiduciary duty
for a land trustee to act as both trustee and secured creditor of the
same land trust. 36 Accordingly, Sanelli contended that the Act viproceeds from the rental, sale, hypothecation or other disposition thereof, and
under which the interest of the beneficiary is personal property only.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, para. 82(a) (1985).
123. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 8-9, 483 N.E.2d at 229 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148,
para. 83 (1985)). The Act "applies to all security interests in a beneficial interest in land
trusts and all mortgages on land trust property and to all debts secured thereby, whether
arising before, on, or after the effective date of this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, para.
83 (1985).
124. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 6, 483 N.E.2d at 227-28.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 29, 483 N.E.2d at 238.
127. Id. at 6, 483 N.E.2d at 228.
128. Id. A beneficiary is defined as a person for whose benefit property is held in
trust. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (5th ed. 1979).
129. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 6, 483 N.E.2d at 228.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 7,483 N.E.2d at 228 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, paras. 81-84 (1985)).
134. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841
(1982).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 239, 432 N.E.2d at 845.
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olated the principle of separation of powers 3 by attempting to
nullify the court's decision in Zarkin. a8 Sanelli further asserted
that approval of the retroactive application of the statute would
render the Zarkin decision meaningless.' 39 The Illinois Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that it was permissible to change the effect
of a prior decision with respect to others in similar circumstances
whose rights have not yet been finally adjudicated. 40 The court in
Sanelli cautioned, however, that a court may not apply a statute
retroactively in an attempt to change the result of a final decision
regarding the parties before it. 141

Sanelli also argued that the provision allowing retroactive application of the statute violated the United States Constitution's prohibition against laws that impair contracts. 42 Additionally, Sanelli
asserted that the application of the Act permits a taking of property without due process of law. 43 The court, however, rejected
both of these contentions.'" Considering the arguments together,
the court stated that, assuming a law impairs the obligations of
private contracts, it nevertheless may be constitutional if it is rea45
sonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.
The Sanelli court held that the Act satisfied this standard because
its stated purpose was a reasonable exercise of the legislature's authority to provide for the public welfare and to safeguard the interests of the people.' 46 The court also stated that the Act codifies the
accepted practice of one party serving as both the lender and the
trustee to a land trust.'

The court in Sanelli further noted that

the Act was designed to encourage the continued availability of
real estate financing. 48 Therefore, the court held that the retroactivity provision was constitutional and did not deprive Sanelli, or
137. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 9, 483 N.E.2d at 229 (citing ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1). The
Illinois Constitution provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." ILL. CONST. art.

ii, § 1.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 9, 483 N.E.2d at 229.
Id.
Id. at 10, 483 N.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 10, 483 N.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 19, 483 N.E.2d at 234 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 19, 483 N.E.2d at 234 (citing U.S. CONST. amend XIV;
ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 16).
144. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 29, 483 N.E.2d at 238.
145. Id. at 22, 483 N.E.2d at 235.
146. Id. at 23-24, 483 N.E.2d at 236.
147. Id. at 21, 483 N.E.2d at 234.
148. Id. at 22-23, 483 N.E.2d at 235 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, para. 81(b)
(1985)).
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others similarly situated, of property without due process of law. 149
The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Sanelli lays to rest
any challenge to the constitutionality of retroactive application of
the Illinois statute permitting an individual or entity to act both in
the capacity of land trustee and lender to the land trust. Though
the Sanelli case did not alter the principle that a land trustee's duties are fiduciary in nature, it did enunciate one type of transaction
which would not be considered a breach of that fiduciary duty.
Following Sanelli, land trustees in Illinois may continue the practice of borrowing from themselves upon the security of the trust
property. This transaction does not violate any duty by which the
land trustee is bound.
B.

Real Estate Sales Contract: Voidability Provision

In Meeker v. Tulis, 150 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth
District examined the constitutionality of the Illinois Sale of
Dwelling Structures Act (the "Act"). 51 The Act provides that a
buyer of real estate under an installment contract may void that
contract unless there is a certificate of compliance attached to the
contract or incorporated therein.' 52 The Meeker court upheld the
statute's constitutionality. 5 3 Accordingly, the court allowed the
defendant to void a contract to which
the plaintiff had failed to
54
attach a certificate of compliance.
In Meeker, the seller, Meeker, and the buyer, Tulis, entered into
an installment sales contract for the sale of real estate. 5 5 Tulis
allegedly failed to make payments under the contract and, in response, Meeker brought suit to recover the amount due.' 56 The
trial court granted Tulis's motion to dismiss based on Meeker's
149. Sanelli, 108 Ill. 2d at 29, 483 N.E.2d at 238. The Sanelli holding recently was
applied by the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District. See Willard v. Northwest
National Bank, 137 Ill. App. 3d 255, 484 N.E.2d 823 (1st Dist. 1985).
150. 134 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 481 N.E.2d 810 (5th Dist. 1985).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, paras. 8.21, 8.22 (1985).
152. Meeker, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 1095, 481 N.E.2d at 812-13 (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 29, para. 8.22 (1985)). A certificate of compliance is defined by the Act as follows:
An affidavit executed by a contract seller stating that the dwelling structure was
inspected within 30 days before the contract was executed by an Inspector of
the Municipality of the County wherein the premises is located, and that at the
date of the execution of the contract the structure is not in violation of any
dwelling code.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.21(f) (1985).
153. Meeker, 134 111. App. 3d at 1098, 481 N.E.2d at 815.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1094-95, 481 N.E.2d at 812.
156. Id. at 1095, 481 N.E.2d at 812.
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failure to attach a certificate of compliance to the installment contract as required by the Illinois Sale of Dwelling Structures Act. 157
On appeal, Meeker argued that the Act was unconstitutional because it deprived sellers under installment real estate contracts of
the right to contract without due process of the law.'"8
In considering the Act's constitutionality, 59 the court utilized a
test of reasonableness. 16° The reasonableness test considered
whether the statute sought to achieve an end within the State's police power and whether the means utilized to achieve those ends
were reasonable. 6 ' The Meeker court concluded that the purpose
of the Act was to force the seller under an installment contract to
furnish the buyer with information about the property being
purchased. 62 The court held that such a purpose was within the
state's police power. 163
Next, the court determined that the statute was a reasonable
164
means to achieve the constitutionally permissible purpose.
Under the statute, a buyer is permitted to declare void any nonconforming real estate contract. 65 The court concluded that because
this power merely enables the buyer to regulate the transaction,
rather than prevent it,166the Act was a reasonable means of achieving
its intended purpose.
Meeker further argued that the Act was unconstitutionally arbitrary because it was limited to installment contracts and excluded
cash sales. 67 The court disagreed and held that the statute.was
designed to protect the majority of purchasers:' 61 those who cannot
169
pay cash and do not have bargaining leverage with the seller.
The court reasoned that purchasers for cash are generally in a bet17
ter position to bargain and often have more financial expertise. 1
157. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.22 (1985)).
158. Meeker, 134 I11.App. 3d at 1095, 481 N.E.2d at 813.
159. Id. at 1096, 481 N.E.2d at 813. The Meeker court noted that acts of the legislature are presumptively constitutional. It is the burden of the party challenging a statute
to prove its unconstitutionality. Id. (citing Rawlings v. Department of Law Enforcement,
73 I11.App. 3d 267, 273, 391 N.E.2d 758, 762 (3rd Dist. 1979)).
160. Meeker, 134 I11.App. 3d at 1096, 481 N.E.2d at 814.
161. Id. at 1096, 481 N.E.2d at 813.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1096, 481 N.E.2d at 814.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1097, 481 N.E.2d at 814.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Consequently, in the court's view, such purchasers do not need the
protection of the statute.''
Sellers of residential property pursuant to installment sales contracts should be aware of the existence and constitutionality of the
Illinois Sale of Dwelling Structures Act.'72 The Act grants to the
purchaser a right to void the installment sale contract if the seller
fails to include a certificate of compliance in the installment sale
contract, or, in the alternative, to provide the purchaser with an
express written warranty. 17 3 If the seller fails to comply with the
statute, the purchaser has the right to void the contract.' 74 This
right is not violative of the seller's constitutional right to
contract. 171
V.

LEGISLATION

During the Survey year, the Illinois General Assembly addressed
various aspects of real estate law. The General Assembly considered, but failed to pass, a bill enhancing service of process on outof-state landlords 76 and a Tenants Bill of Rights.' 77 Despite State
171. Id.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, paras. 8.21-.22 (1985).
173. Id. at para. 8.22.
174. Id.
175. Meeker, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 1098, 481 N.E.2d at 815.
176. S.B. 2041, 84th I11. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1986). The Bill would require the
owner of a residential structure containing twelve or more dwelling units to record the
name of a registered agent for service of process with the recorder of deeds for the county
in which the structure is located. The Bill was intended to prevent an out-of-state landlord from being able to avoid service of process. Id. The Bill was referred to the Rules
Committee on April 11, 1986. 1 LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST 552 (July 23,
1986).
177. H.B. 0329, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1986). The Tenants Bill of Rights,
which was put on the Interim Study Calendar/Judiciary I on May 3, 1986, provides a
scheme for the protection of tenants from actions by landlords in retaliation to reporting
of housing or health code violations. Id. The widespread adoption of housing codes and
residential landlord-tenant legislation, and the subsequent assertion of rights by tenants
pursuant to this legislation, was met with retaliatory conduct by many landlords. D.
HILL, supra note 31, at 144. This retaliatory conduct included refusal to renew leases,
termination of leases, and rent increases. Id.
The Tenants Bill of Rights defines a landlord as an owner or lessor of a building of
seven or more units. H.B. 0329 at sec. 3(d)(1). A tenant is defined as a party in possession of a dwelling unit for a week-to-week term or any longer term pursuant to a written
or oral agreement with a landlord. Id. at sec. 3(d)(2). The Bill specifies actions which
may be taken and available remedies for both landlord and tenant. Id. at sec. 2-12. If, for
example, a landlord fails to maintain a tenant's rental unit, the tenant may, after notification to the landlord of his intent, repair the condition of the unit or area and deduct the
appropriate amount from his rent. Id. at sec. 4. The benefit of a provision defining available remedies is that it allows the courts to circumvent the problem of determining damages when landlord-tenant disputes arise. See supra note 33 for a discussion of damages
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legislative inaction in areas of landlord-tenant reform, the Chicago
City Council approved the Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (the "RLTO" and the "Ordinance") in September 1986. Iv8
The RLTO provides comprehensive regulation of residential tenancies with the goal of equalizing and clarifying the rights and duties of landlords and tenants. 179 The RLTO explicitly requires that
it be construed liberally in order to promulgate its purposes and
policies.180 The Ordinance sets forth the responsibilities of landlords and tenants.' 8 ' Additionally, the RLTO provides remedies
for injured landlords or tenants upon a violation by the other
party. 182
The Chicago RLTO is patterned closely after the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and an ordinance passed in the
City of Evanston, Illinois, in 1975.183 The RLTO regulates landlord-tenant relationships in Chicago with respect to landlords' access to apartments, security deposits, subleases, abandonment,
retaliatory conduct, lock-outs, disclosure of information, provision
of receipts and notices, and building maintenance. 84 The law creates several remedies for tenants if their landlords fail to maintain
their buildings and apartments in compliance with applicable housing codes.' 8 5 Those remedies include recovery of damages based
resolution. For additional commentary, see K. Dutenhaver, Basic Landlord-Tenant Law,
LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE I, § 1-14 (Ill. Inst. for CLE 1979).
More than forty states have enacted comprehensive laws regulating landlord-tenant
relationships within their jurisdictions. Glendon, The Transformation ofAmerican Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REV. 503, 523-24, (1982). In addition, many major municipalities have approved legislation which affects residential tenancies within their borders.

See, e.g.,

EVANSTON, ILL., ORDINANCE

§ 5-3 (June 1, 1975). Legislative bodies in Illi-

nois and Chicago have considered such comprehensive legislation for many years. Prior
to September 1986, any statutory regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship by either
jurisdiction was piecemeal, focusing on specific problems in the relationship. For example, in 1963, the State of Illinois enacted the Tenant's Complaint of Violations of Governmental Regulations Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, para. 71 (1985). This Act precludes
retaliatory conduct by a landlord when a tenant reports violations of an applicable building code to a governmental authority. Id.
178. CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCE § 193.1 (September 8, 1986).
179. Id. at § 193.1-1.
180. Id.
181. For a representation of the responsibilities set forth in the Ordinance, see id. at
§ 193.1-4 (Tenant Responsibilities), § 193.1-7 (Landlord's Responsibility to Maintain),
§ 193.1-8 (Security Deposits), § 193.1-9 (Identification of Owner and Agents), § 193.1-10
(Notice of Conditions Affecting Habitability), and § 193.1-15 (Prohibition of Retaliatory
Conduct by Landlord).
182. Id. at § 193.1-11 (Tenant Remedies).
183. EVANSTON, ILL., ORDINANCE § 5-3.
184. CHICAGO, ILL, ORDINANCE § 193.1.
185. Id. at § 193.1-11.
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on the reduction in the fair rental value of the unit during the time
when the defects exist, recovery of damages based on any difference in rent paid by reason of substitute housing, and recovery of
damages based on a repair and deduct theory. 8 6 The RLTO requires landlords to supply tenants with a summary of the Ordinance when a tenancy is commenced."8 7
By enacting the RLTO, the City of Chicago has entered the
modem era of landlord-tenant regulation. The Ordinance itself is
only moderately reformative with regard to substantive rights and
remedies, as compared to laws which license landlords or regulate
rents. Thus, the RLTO will affect only minimally good landlords
and tenants who maintain their properties. Nevertheless, the
RLTO will promote a better balance in legal rights of landlords
and tenants188 in Chicago by providing effective remedies when
either landlords or tenants fail to comply with the law or their
rental agreements. 89
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois courts decided numerous real property and real estate transaction issues during the Survey year. The Illinois
186. Id. at § 193.11(e).
187. Id. at § 193.1-17.
188. The legal principles applicable to the relationship between landlords and tenants
in Illinois have long favored landlords. The common law in this area, rooted in English
concepts of feudal property rights, granted virtually all rights to landlords and minimal
rights to tenants. The tenant at common law had no direct cause of action and was
somewhat unprotected. D. HILL, supra note 31, at 2. Case decisions in Illinois over the
years similarly have reflected adherence to these common law precedents. See supra note
29 and accompanying text. Historically, in the legislative bodies in Illinois, real estate
interests possessed much more political influence than tenants and, consequently, most
statutory enactments favored landlords. Landlords, for example, have long had the right
to terminate tenancies by written notice. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-209 (Supp.
1986). Tenants in Illinois have no similar statutory right to terminate.
Finally, written leases in Illinois usually are standard forms written by representatives
of landlords and offered to tenants on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Most of these standard
form leases carefully protect the interests of landlords while creating virtually no rights
or remedies for tenants. In fact, these leases often contain language by which a tenant
purports to waive various rights and remedies. See Dutenhaver, Non- Waiver of the Implied Warrantyof Habitabilityin ResidentialLeases, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 44 (1978).
189. The Ordinance has received significant attention from tenants' groups as well as
various realtor organizations. The Chicago Board of Realtors brought suit in the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois and received a temporary restraining order,
delaying the effectuation of the Ordinance. On November 3, 1986, Judge James B. Parsons vacated the temporary restraining order and denied the request for a preliminary
injunction. Judge Parsons indicated, however, that upon plaintiff's request, he would
certify the matter for appeal. Chicago Board of Realtors v. City of Chicago, No. 86 - 7763
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1986) (order denying preliminary injunction and vacating temporary
restraining order).
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Supreme Court extended the implied warranty of habitability to all
residential property regardless of the absence of a building code in
the municipality in which the property is located. Additionally, the
court reaffirmed the parameters of the doctrine of lessor immunity
and redefined the common law doctrine of emblements. On the
transactional level, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the
trustee to a land trust may serve both as trustee and creditor to
that land trust. The Illinois legislature defeated several bills containing significant landlord-tenant reform. The City of Chicago,
however, enacted the Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance
which provides both landlords and tenants with significant
protections.
AUTHORS' NOTE

The Illinois Legislature passed a new Mortgage Foreclosure Act
after this article went to press. The new Mortgage Foreclosure Act
seeks to simplify mortgage foreclosure procedure as well as to codify existing mortgage foreclosure law. The Act goes into effect July
1, 1987.

